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ERISA'S REMEDIAL IRONY: NARROW
INTERPRETATION PAVES THE WAY FOR JURY
TRIALS IN SUITS FOR BREACH OF FIDUCIARY
DUTY UNDER ERISA
Kris Alderman*
INTRODUCTION
When Eugene Scalia, son of Supreme Court Justice Antonin
Scalia, filed an amicus brief arguing that monetary relief for a breach
of fiduciary duty was "traditionally, typically, and exclusively"
available in courts of equity, the suggestion was clear that the
remedial provisions of the Employee Retirement Income Security Act
(ERISA) of 19741 were capable of dividing even families.2 Through a
series of opinions, two of which were written by Justice Scalia, the
Supreme Court has narrowly construed the term "equitable" as used
in ERISA's remedial provisions, 3 by excluding money damages from
that term's ambit.4 In the process, the Court paved the way for
plaintiffs seeking money damages under ERISA § 502(a)(2) to
exercise their Seventh Amendment right to a jury trial.5
* J.D. 2010, Georgia State University College of Law.
1. Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA), Pub. L. No. 93-406, 88 Stat. 829 (1974)
(codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1461 (2000)).
2. John H. Langbein, What ERISA Means by "Equitable": The Supreme Court's Trail of Error in
Russell, Mertens, andGreat-West, 103 CoLUM. L. REv. 1317, 1352 (2003) (citing Amended Brief of the
Secretary of Labor as Amici Curiae Opposing the Motions to Dismiss at 51, In re Enron Corp., No.
MDL 1446,2002 WL 32116900 (S.D. Tex. Mar. 28, 2002)).
3. ERISA § 502 (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. § 1132 (2000)).
4. Great-West Life & Annuity Ins. Co. v. Knudson, 534 U.S. 204 (2002) (Scalia, J.); Mertens v.
Hewitt Assocs., 508 U.S. 248 (1993) (Scalia, J.); Mass. Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Russell, 473 U.S. 134
(1985) (Stevens, J.). Also relevant to the trilogy of Russell, Mertens, and Great-West is Justice Scalia's
dissenting opinion in Bowen v. Massachusetts, 487 U.S. 879, 913 (1988).
5. See generally Donald T. Bogan, ERISA: Re-Thinking Firestone in Light of Great-West-
Implications for Standard of Review and the Right to a Jury Trial in Welfare Benefit Claims, 37 J.
MARSHALL L. REV. 629 (2004); Mark D. DeBofsky, The Paradox of the Misuse of Administrative Law
in ERISA Benefit Claims, 37 J. MARSHALL L. REv. 727, 742 (2004); Andrew T. Kusner, Mertens v.
Hewitt & Associates, and the ERISA Liability of the Professional Service Provider, 15 BERKELEY J.
EMP. & LAB. L. 273,304 (1994).
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The purpose of this Note is to determine whether ERISA, in light
of its interpretation by the Supreme Court, permits a jury trial for
plaintiffs seeking damages for a breach of fiduciary duty. Part I
examines the nature, purposes, and scope of ERISA. 6  After
presenting a brief background, this Note surveys the development of
Supreme Court case law relevant to the questions whether damages
are available under § 502(a)(2) and whether damages are legal rather
than equitable relief.7 Next, the requirements for invoking the
Seventh Amendment right to a jury trial are discussed.8 Part II then
applies relevant Supreme Court jurisprudence to demands for jury
trials under § 502(a)(2) and discusses rationales of lower courts
addressing the question directly.9 Part III suggests an answer to the
question, hypothesizes contrary arguments, and discusses the
likelihood of the Supreme Court squarely addressing the question.'
0
Finally, this Note concludes that at least some claims brought under
ERISA § 502(a)(2) for breach of fiduciary duty permit a jury trial
upon demand.
I. BACKGROUND
A. Nature, Purposes, and Scope of ERISA
ERISA was enacted by the 93rd Congress l after a decade of
legislative and executive branch inquiries into the private pension and
6. See discussion infra Part I.A-B.
7. See discussion infra Part I.C. The Court recognizes that some forms of restitution, for which
money damages are available, are equitable rather than legal. Great-West, 534 U.S. at 212-13 (holding
restitution is a legal remedy when the plaintiff "could not assert title or right to possession of particular
property, but in which he might be able to show just grounds for recovering money to pay for some
benefit the defendant had received from him"; but it is an equitable remedy "where money or property
identified as belonging in good conscience to the plaintiff could clearly be traced to particular funds or
property in the defendant's possession").
8. See discussion infra Part I.D.
9. See discussion infra Part H.
10. See discussion infra Part Ill.
11. ABA SECTION OF LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT LAW, EMPLOYEE BENEFITS LAW 1, at xxxix (Steven
J. Sacher et al. eds., BNA Books 1991). The 93rd Congress was one of the most active and influential,
enacting two other pieces of landmark legislation, the War Powers Act and the Budget Reform and
Impoundment Act. Id. Additionally, the 93rd Congress only avoided impeachment proceedings against
President Nixon because he resigned first. Id
[Vol. 26:3
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FIDUCIARY DUTY UNDER ERISA
employee welfare system.12 ERISA was enacted for the benefit of
pension and welfare plan participants and their beneficiaries,
regulating employee benefit plans and protecting the funds invested
in such plans.' 3 Notwithstanding its simplicity of purpose, ERISA is
"an enormously complex and detailed statute that resolved
innumerable disputes between powerful competing interests-not all
in favor of potential plaintiffs.' 4 Since its enactment, ERISA's scope
has been evident from the burden it has placed on the federal
courts-and the courts have noticed ERISA's complexity.' 5 The
Court has often noted the careful drafting and integration of ERISA's
enforcement provisions.'
6
ERISA fiduciary law undoubtedly draws heavily from the common
law of trusts.' 7 However, ERISA does not merely codify the common
law of trusts. For example, ERISA defines a fiduciary functionally as
anyone who exercises control or authority over a plan, rather than in
terms of formal trusteeship as is done at common law.' 8 By doing so,
12. Id. at 6-7.
13. ERISA FIDUCIARY LAW 3 (Susan P. Serota ed., BNA Books 1995); see also 29 U.S.C. § 1001
(2000). For a general discussion of the purposes of ERISA, see ABA SECTION OF LABOR AND
EMPLOYMENT LAW, supra note 11, at 17-19.
14. Mertens v. Hewitt Assocs., 508 U.S. 248, 262 (1993). The Court is thus cognizant of the
legislative challenge to balance interests between protecting employees' promised benefits under private
plans offered by employers and employers' interests in controlling costs. Id. at 262-63. The Court
previously recognized that Congress was concerned that the cost of federal standards would discourage
growth of private pension plans. Mass. Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Russell, 473 U.S. 134, 148 n.17 (1985).
Presumably the Court recognized that its ERISA jurisprudence was subject to the same concerns.
15. Dana M. Muir, ERISA Remedies: Chimera or Congressional Compromise?, 81 IOWA L. REV. 1,
3 (1995) (reporting that in 1993 Justice White lamented that Supreme Court Justices "have 'ERISA
cases coming out of [their] ears' (quoting Fiduciary Responsibility: Justices Question Whether Non-
Fiduciary Is Liable for Money Damages Under ERISA, 20 PENSION & BENEFITS REP. (BNA) 524 (Mar.
1, 1993))). The Court has perhaps also been lamenting when it has repeatedly observed that ERISA is a
"comprehensive and reticulated statute." Great-West Life & Annuity Ins. Co. v. Knudson, 534 U.S. 204,
209 (2002) (quoting Mertens, 508 U.S. at 251).
16. Great-West, 534 U.S. at 209; Mertens, 508 U.S. at 261-62; Russell, 473 U.S. at 146-47. In spite
of the Court's repeated insistence that the remedial provisions were carefully drafted and integrated,
these provisions have not been regarded as perfect. Mertens, 508 U.S. at 259 n.8; Russell, 473 U.S. at
156-57 (Brennan, J., dissenting). For a more thorough argument regarding the legislative shortcomings
of the ERISA enforcement scheme, see Langbein, supra note 2, at 1345.
17. LaRue v. DeWolff, Boberg & Assocs., 128 S. Ct. 1020, 1024 n.4 (2008) (citing Varity Corp. v.
Howe, 516 U.S. 489, 496-97 (1996)); Russell, 473 U.S. at 153 n.6 (Brennan, J., concurring); ERISA
FIDUCIARY LAW, supra note 13, at 4; Langbein, supra note 2, at 1317; Muir, supra note 15, at 18.
18. Mertens, 508 U.S. at 262. ERISA § 3(21)(A) (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. § 1002(21)(A)
(2000)), provides:
20101
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ERISA expands its coverage beyond that of common law trust
principles.' 9 ERISA § 404 outlines fiduciary duties, the basic premise
being that fiduciaries must act solely in the interest of beneficiaries,
with fiduciary actions being tested under the prudent man standard. 20
Section 409 describes the liability of fiduciaries for breaches of their
22*duty.21 Finally, § 502 creates causes of action, including a right of
action for fiduciary liability created under § 409.23 However, despite
ERISA's complexity and integration, the statute does not expressly
provide whether a jury trial is available.24
B. ERISA § 502(a)(2) and Other Relevant Enforcement Provisions
ERISA § 502(a)(2) permits the Secretary of Labor or a plan
participant, beneficiary, or fiduciary to bring a civil action for
"appropriate relief under section 409. ,25 In turn, under § 409, "[tjhe
fiduciary is personally liable for damages . . . for restitution ... and
for 'such other equitable or remedial relief as the court may deem
appropriate,' including removal of the fiduciary." 26  Two other
Except as otherwise provided in subparagraph (B), a person is a fiduciary with respect to
a plan to the extent (i) he exercises any discretionary authority or discretionary control
respecting management of such plan or exercises any authority or control respecting
management or disposition of its assets, (ii) he renders investment advice for a fee or
other compensation, direct or indirect, with respect to any moneys or other property of
such plan, or has any authority or responsibility to do so, or (iii) he has any discretionary
authority or discretionary responsibility in the administration of such plan. Such term
includes any person designated under section 1 105(c)(1)(B) of this title.
19. Mertens, 508 U.S. at 262.
20. ERISA FIDUCIARY LAW, supra note 13, at 19-21; see 29 U.S.C. § 1104 (2000).
21. ERISA § 409 (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. § 1109 (2000)).
22. Id. § 502 (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. § 1132 (2000)).
23. Id. § 502(a)(2) (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(2) (2000)).
24. ABA SECTION OF LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT LAW, supra note 11, at 527, 634-40; ERISA
FIDUCIARY LAW, supra note 13, at 403.
25. ERISA § 502(a)(2) (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(2) (2000)). The use of the word
"appropriate" is interesting in this context. Although the Court has never expressly interpreted that
language in the statute, Chief Justice Roberts recently suggested that it should be interpreted in the same
way that the Court has interpreted "appropriate" in the phrase "other appropriate equitable relief" in
§ 502(a)(3)-to preclude relief under this section if any other section would afford the plaintiff an
adequate remedy. LaRue v. DeWolff, Boberg & Assocs., Inc., 128 S, Ct. 1020, 1026-27 (2008)
(Roberts, C.J., concurring). Regardless of the merits of this suggestion, it at least raises the question of
why Congress thought it important to use the word "appropriate."
26. Mertens v. Hewitt Assocs., 508 U.S. 248, 253 (1993) (internal quotations omitted). 29 U.S.C.
§ 1109(a) (2000) provides:
[Vol. 26:3
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FIDUCIARY DUTY UNDER ERISA
remedial provisions are important in understanding the Court's
jurisprudence in the area of ERISA remedies. Section 502(a)(1)(B)
provides that a participant or beneficiary may bring a civil action "to
recover benefits due to him under the terms of his plan, to enforce his
rights under the terms of the plan, or to clarify his rights to future
benefits under the terms of the plan." 27  Section 502(a)(3) is a
"catchall provision," providing for equitable relief for injuries not
adequately remedied by the other provisions of § 502.28 ERISA's
other enforcement provisions are not pertinent to understanding
§ 502(a)(2).
C. Supreme Court Jurisprudence Relevant to ERISA 's Remedial
Provisions
1. Massachusetts Mutual Life Insurance Co. v. Russell
29
In a 5-4 decision, the Court in Massachusetts Mutual Life
Insurance Co. decided that a participant or beneficiary cannot recover
extracontractual or punitive damages for a claim brought under
§ 502(a)(2).3" Justice Stevens, writing for the Court, stated that § 409
was clearly concerned with protecting the plan as a whole from
misuse of assets rather than providing a cause of action to individual
Any person who is a fiduciary with respect to a plan who breaches any of the
responsibilities, obligations, or duties imposed upon fiduciaries by this subchapter shall
be personally liable to make good to such plan any losses to the plan resulting from each
such breach, and to restore to such plan any profits of such fiduciary which have been
made through use of assets of the plan by the fiduciary, and shall be subject to such other
equitable or remedial relief as the court may deem appropriate, including removal of such
fiduciary.
27. 29 U.S.C. § 132(a)(l)(B) (2000).
28. Varity Corp. v. Howe, 516 U.S. 489, 512 (1996). 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(3) provides:
A civil action may be brought by a participant, beneficiary, or fiduciary (A) to enjoin any
act or practice which violates any provision of this subchapter or the terms of the plan, or
(B) to obtain other appropriate equitable relief (i) to redress such violations or (ii) to
enforce any provisions of this subchapter or the terms of the plan.
29. Mass. Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Russell, 437 U.S. 134 (1985).
30. Id. at 144. The Court expressly decided the narrow question presented-whether a beneficiary or
participant is entitled to recover extracontractual and punitive damages for a breach of fiduciary duty-
rather than the broader question of whether a fiduciary may ever be liable for extracontractual or
punitive damages, for example where the plaintiff seeks recovery inuring to the plan itself. Id. at 144
n.12.
20101
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beneficiaries. 31 The principal duties imposed on fiduciaries "relate to
the proper management, administration, and investment of fund
assets, the maintenance of proper records, the disclosure of specified
information, and the avoidance of conflicts of interest." 32 Given that
ERISA is comprehensive legislation with an integrated system of
enforcement, there is a strong presumption that Congress did not
intend to allow any remedies not expressly provided by statute.
33
Concurring in the judgment only, Justice Brennan agreed that
§ 502(a)(2) was not the proper vehicle for recovery to an individual
beneficiary or participant.34 However, apparently because he inferred
that the plaintiff was not entitled to recovery under the majority
opinion, Justice Brennan argued that § 502(a)(3), the catchall
provision, allows an individual plaintiff to recover extracontractual or
punitive damages from a fiduciary for a breach of duty.35 Justice
Brennan's opinion relies on the common law of trusts, which
traditionally constructed make-whole remedies to strictly enforce
fiduciary duties and protect beneficiaries.
36
31. Id. at 142.
32. Id. at 142-43.
33. Russell, 437 U.S. at 146-48. The Court also found support from the fact an early version of the
bill included a provision for legal and equitable relief, described as providing the full range of legal and
equitable remedies, but in the version finally enacted the reference to legal relief was deleted. Id. at 145-
46. It is not clear how crucial this factor was in the Court's decision, although the fact that the Court did
not use it to reject outright the possibility that the legal remedies sought were unavailable under any set
of facts is evidence that it was not controlling. Id. at 144 n.12.
34. Id. at 150 (Brennan, J., concurring).
35. Id. Brennan's argument embraces the broader meaning of "equitable," i.e., relief that was
available in courts of equity for a breach of fiduciary duty, which is thoroughly rejected by the Court in
Mertens and Great- West.
36. Russell, 473 U.S. at 156-57 (Brennan, J., concurring). The argument relies on ERISA's
legislative history for the propositions that ERISA engrafted the common law of trusts on fiduciaries
with modifications, allowing the courts to develop a federal common law of ERISA. While a majority of
the Court's jurisprudence in this area has developed without the use of legislative history, these two
arguments have been unquestionably accepted. See, e.g., Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Bruch, 489
U.S. 101, 110 (1989) ("Given [the statutory] language and history, we have held that courts are to
develop a 'federal common law of rights and obligations under ERISA-regulated plans."' (quoting Pilot
Life Ins. Co. v. Dedeaux, 481 U.S. 41, 56 (1987))).
[Vol. 26:3
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2. Bowen v. Massachusetts37
Although not an ERISA decision, Bowen is relevant because it
provides a preview of Justice Scalia's arguments regarding the nature
of legal and equitable relief that dominate later developments in
ERISA remedial law.38 Justice Scalia's Bowen arguments, made in
dissent, urged that differentiation between damages 39 and specific
relief must be based on the claim's substance rather than form.4 ° As
Justice Scalia noted, "[d]amages compensate the plaintiff for a loss"
or injury resulting from a breach of legal duty, but specific relief
"prevents or undoes" a loss, for example by ordering the return of the
precise property wrongfully taken or enjoining acts that would cause
a future injury.4 1 According to Justice Scalia, "[a]lmost invariably...
suits seeking (whether by judgment, injunction, or declaration) to
compel the defendant to pay a sum of money to the plaintiff are suits
for 'money damages' ' ,,42 Not only the rationale, but exact
language from Justice Scalia's Bowen dissent would become the
majority opinion in subsequent ERISA cases.
3. Mertens v. Hewitt Associates
43
In Mertens, the Court again split 5-4,44 holding that a nonfiduciary
is not liable for knowingly participating in a breach of fiduciary duty
37. Bowen v. Massachusetts, 487 U.S. 879 (1988).
38. The principal question presented was whether the federal courts had jurisdiction to review a final
order of the Secretary of Health and Human Services refusing to reimburse the state for certain
expenditures under Medicaid. Id. at 882. Resolution of the jurisdictional question was dependent upon
whether the plaintiff sought money damages or specific relief. Id. at 893.
39. Justice Scalia notes initially that "money damages" is redundant since "the term 'damages' refers
to money awarded as reparation for injury resulting from breach of legal duty." Id. at 913 (Scalia, J.,
dissenting). See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 416 (8th ed. 2004) (defining damages as "[m]oney claimed
by, or ordered to be paid to, a person as compensation for loss or injury," not defining the term "money
damages").
40. Bowen, 487 U.S. at 915-16 (Scalia, J., dissenting). Indeed, if the division focused on form rather
than substance, the line between specific relief and money damages could be manipulated by lawyerly
inventiveness (and perhaps little of it would be required) in wording the claim. Id.
41. Id. at 913-14. Conceding that claims may fit both the classic definition of a suit for money
damages and also fit the description of specific relief, Justice Scalia asserts that, according to the
common law tradition, recovery of a past due sum that does nothing more than compensate the plaintiff
is recognized as a claim for money damages rather than specific relief. Id. at 917-18.
42. Id. at918-19.
43. Mertens v. Hewitt Assocs., 508 U.S. 248 (1993).
20101
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that results in injury to a plan.45 The plaintiffs in Mertens expressly
disclaimed reliance on § 502(a)(2), instead suing under § 502(a)(3).46
The plaintiffs sought money damages--"the classic form of legal
relief'-for losses resulting from the breach of fiduciary duty.47
However, unlike § 502(a)(2), which expressly makes a fiduciary
personally liable in damages, 48 § 502(a)(3) authorizes only equitable
relief.49 The plaintiffs argued that money damages are authorized
under § 502(a)(3) pursuant to the authority for courts to award "other
appropriate equitable relief."50 The Court conceded that "other
appropriate equitable relief' could mean either "whatever relief a
court of equity is empowered to provide in the particular case at
issue," or it could mean only "those categories of relief that were
typically available in equity." 51 But the Court determined that the
latter meaning was undoubtedly correct, 52  because the former
meaning would render the modifier "equitable" superfluous 53 and
would be inconsistent with the meaning ascribed to "equitable"
elsewhere in ERISA.54
44. The particular alignment of justices in this decision is worth noting-Justice Scalia wrote the
opinion of the Court, joined by Justices Thomas, Souter, Kennedy, and Blackmun, and Justice White,
joined by Justices Rehnquist, Stevens, and O'Connor dissented. Id. at 249.
45. Id. at 261.
46. Given that the plaintiff sought liability against a nonfiduciary, it is exceedingly unlikely that the
result would have been different if the claim was brought under § 502(a)(2). See 29 U.S.C. § 1109(a)
(2000); Mertens, 508 U.S. at 254.
47. Mertens, 508 U.S. at 255 ("[Plaintiffs] do not . . . seek a remedy traditionally viewed as
equitable, such as injunction or restitution."). Notably, Justice Scalia later backs away from any
implication that restitution is typically an equitable remedy. Great-West Life & Annuity Ins. Co. v.
Knudson, 534 U.S. 204, 215 (2002) (citing Reich v. Cont'l Cas. Co., 33 F.3d 754, 756 (7th Cir. 1994)
(Posner, J.)). And Justice Scalia had already said that an injunction to merely pay a sum of money was a
suit for money damages, Bowen, 487 U.S. at 918-19 (Scalia, J., dissenting), and Justice Scalia reiterated
that view in Great-West, 534 U.S. at 210.
48. Mertens, 508 U.S. at 252-53; see also 29 U.S.C. § 1109(a) (2000).
49. Id. at 253 (citing 29 U.S.C. § I 132(a)(3) (2000)).
50. Id. (quoting 29 U.S.C. § 11 32(a)(3) (2000)).
51. Id. at 256.
52. Id at 257.
53. Id. at 258 ("Since all relief... could be obtained from a court of equity, limiting the sort of relief
obtainable under § 502(a)(3) to 'equitable relief' in the sense of 'whatever relief a common-law court of
equity could provide [for breach of fiduciary duty]' would limit the relief not at all. We will not read the
statute to render the modifier superfluous.").
54. Mertens, 508 U.S. at 258. (asserting that Congress's distinction between "equitable" and
"remedial" (ERISA § 409) and between "equitable" and "legal" (ERISA § 502(g)(2)(e)) would be
[Vol. 26:3
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In dissent, Justice White pointed out the anomaly of interpreting
ERISA to provide participants and beneficiaries with less protection
than they had before ERISA, under the common law of trusts.
55
Echoing Justice Brennan's Russell dissent, White asserted that
Congress did not carefully craft the enforcement provisions. For
example, Congress did not likely carefully differentiate between
"equitable" and "remedial" relief.56 But the majority answered this
argument, stating that even if the distinction is "artless," it
nonetheless must be observed as a textual distinction.57 The Court did
not, however, clarify or suggest a possible meaning of "remedial" in
§ 409, but reiterated that "[e]quitable relief' must mean something
less than all relief."
58
4. Great-West Life & Annuity Insurance Co. v. Knudson
59
In Great- West, the Court again decided 5-4,60 holding that
plaintiffs could not enforce a reimbursement provision in an ERISA
plan by bringing a claim under § 502(a)(3). 61 Regardless of whether a
claim is drafted like a claim for injunctive or restitutionary relief, a
claim that seeks nothing more than monetary compensation for a loss
is merely a claim for damages62-the classic form of legal relief63 -
which is not available under § 502(a)(3). 64 Restitution in the form of
money is only equitable when the plaintiff identifies the money
"belonging in good conscience" to him and traces it to particular
meaningless if the Court interpreted "equitable relief" to mean all forms of relief available in equity for
a breach of fiduciary duty and ascribed that meaning to these parallel ERISA provisions).
55. Id. at 263-64 (White, J., dissenting).
56. Id. at 270 n.4 ("What limiting principle Congress could have intended to convey by [remedial] I
cannot readily imagine. 'Remedial,' after all, simply means 'intended as a remedy,'.. . and 'relief is
commonly understood to be a synonym for 'remedy."' (quoting WEBSTER'S NINTH NEW COLLEGIATE
DICTIONARY 996 (1983))).
57. Id. at 259 n.8 (majority opinion).
58. Id. The Court pointed out that Congress also used the phrase "other equitable or remedial relief"
in 5 U.S.C. § 8477(e)(1)(A). Id. However, that language has not been interpreted by the courts.
59. Great-West Life & Annuity Ins. Co. v. Knudson, 534 U.S. 204 (2002).
60. This time the breakdown of Justices was more traditional, with Justices Scalia, Rehnquist,
Thomas, O'Connor, and Kennedy against Ginsburg, Breyer, Souter, and Stevens. Id. at 206.
61. Id. at218.
62. Id. at 210 (citing Bowen v. Massachusetts, 487 U.S. 879, 918-19 (1988)).
63. Id. (citing Mertens v. Hewitt Assocs., 508 U.S. 248, 255 (1993)).
64. Id. at218.
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funds in the defendant's possession.6 5 On the other hand, restitution
seeking merely to hold the defendant personally liable to the plaintiff
is legal relief.66 Thus, whether a claim is legal or equitable is
determined with reference to the basis for the claim and the nature of
the underlying remedies sought.67 Determining whether relief sought
in a particular case is legal or equitable will rarely require more than
consulting "standard current works." 68 Perhaps sensitive to assertions
that the majority result was contrary to congressional intention,69
Justice Scalia wrote, "[i]t is ... not our job to find reasons for what
Congress has plainly done; and it is our job to avoid rendering what
Congress has plainly done... devoid of reason and effect.,
70
Writing in dissent, Justice Ginsburg argued that it was "fanciful" to
believe that Congress intended the technical distinction between legal
and equitable relief that the majority attributed to it.71 Further, she
argued, the fact that the Court examines the state of the common law
as it existed in 1791 to preserve the right to a jury trial as it existed
does not justify an examination of the law in 1791 to give meaning to
a statute enacted in 1974.72
5. Sereboff v. Mid Atlantic Medical Services
73
Writing for a unanimous court in 2006, 74 Chief Justice Roberts in
Sereboff distinguished the case from Great- West, where an employer
sought to enforce a reimbursement provision through a judgment for
money not in the participant's possession.75 In Sereboff, the Court
applied the reasoning of Great-West to determine that since the
65. Great-West, 534 U.S. at 213.
66. Id.
67. Id.
68. Id. at 217 (indentifying Dobbs, Palmer, Corbin, and the Restatements as "standard current
works"). Perhaps out of character, Justice Scalia did not respond to Justice Ginsburg's complaint that the
"standard current works" do not always yield a single, consistent answer. See id. at 232 (Ginsburg, J.,
dissenting).
69. Id. at 223 (Stevens, J., dissenting); id. at 234 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
70. Id. at 217-18 (majority opinion).
71. Great-West, 534 U.S. at 225, 227 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
72. Id. at 233.
73. Sereboffv. Mid At. Med. Servs., Inc., 547 U.S. 356 (2006).
74. Id. at 359.
75. Id. at 362.
[Vol. 26:3
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plaintiff sought nothing more than recovery of "'specifically
identifiable' funds . . . 'within the possession and control of the
Sereboff's,"' in other words a constructive trust or equitable lien on
settlement proceeds, the plaintiff could recover under the "other
appropriate equitable relief' provision of § 502(a)(3).7 6 The result
was uncontroversial. In fact, shortly after announcing the decision in
Sereboff, the Chief Justice touted it as a simplification of the law.77
6. LaRue v. DeWolff, Boberg & Associates, Inc.
78
Recognizing fundamental changes in pension plans since Russell,
the Court in LaRue revisited language from Russell suggesting that
relief is only available for breaches of fiduciary duty affecting the
entire plan.79 Since Russell, defined contribution plans had replaced
defined benefit plans as the norm. 80 In light of this development, the
Court in LaRue held that "although § 502(a)(2) does not provide a
remedy for individual injuries distinct from plan injuries, that
provision does authorize recovery for fiduciary breaches that impair
the value of plan assets in a participant's individual account." 8' Aside
from deciding that breaches affecting 401 (k) or other individual plan
participant accounts are remediable under § 502(a)(2), the Court also
expresses its understanding that claims for lost profits are cognizable
76. Id. at 362-63 (quoting Mid Atl. Med. Servs., LLC v. Sereboff, 407 F.3d 212, 218 (2005)).
77. Posting of Colleen Medill to Workplace Prof Blog, Sereboff and the Future of ERISA Remedies,
http:/ilawprofessors.typepad.com/laborprof blog/2006/05/sereboff and th.htmi (July 26, 2009, 14:52
EST). Medill acknowledges Sereboff managed to sidestep the more difficult issues confronted in Great-
West and moved the Court's analysis away from focus on 18th century causes of action; however, she
concludes that Sereboff may be more appropriately described as "subtle change" than "simplification."
Id.
78. LaRue v. DeWolff, Boberg & Assocs., 128 S. Ct. 1020 (2008).
79. Id. at 1022 (observing that although the language in Russell is consistent with the Fourth
Circuit's decision, the rationale in Russell is not).
80. Id. at 1025. When ERISA was enacted and, later, when Russell was decided, most pension plans
were "defined benefit plans." Id. Since Russell, "defined contribution plans" have emerged as the
dominate form of pension plan. Id. Under defined benefit plans, employees receive a definite sum of
money, usually determined by a formula factoring in yearly salary before retirement and number of
years worked. Edward A. Zelinkski, The Defined Contribution Paradigm, 114 YALE L.J. 451, 455
(2004). Plan assets are usually maintained in a single account from which benefits are disbursed. Id. at
456. On the other hand, defined contribution plans promise a certain contribution from an employer to
the participant's individual account. Id. at 455. Generally, participants make contributions and may
maintain control over management of the assets in their individual accounts. Id. at 457.
81. LaRue, 128 S. Ct. at 1026.
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under § 502(a)(2). 82 Interestingly, the Court relied on the common
law of trusts for this proposition, noting that § 409 closely resembles
the Restatement of Trusts.
83
Finally, concurring in judgment only, Justice Thomas, joined by
Justice Scalia, argued that §§ 409 and 502(a)(2) unambiguously allow
the beneficiary of an individual account to recover for fiduciary
breach since the assets allocated to an individual account are plan
assets within the meaning of ERISA. s4
D. Seventh Amendment Right to a Jury Trial
The Constitution guarantees that "[i]n suits at common law, where
the value in controversy shall exceed twenty dollars, the right of trial
by jury shall be preserved. ,,85 The phrase "suits at common law"
has consistently been interpreted as meaning "suits in which legal
rights were to be ascertained and determined in contradistinction to
those where equitable rights alone were recognized, and equitable
remedies were administered., 8 6 Nevertheless,
when Congress provides for enforcement of statutory rights in an
ordinary civil action in the district courts, where there is
obviously no functional justification for denying the jury trial
right, a jury trial must be available if the action involves rights
and remedies87 of the sort typically enforced in an action at law.
88
82. Id. at 1024 n.4.
83. Id. (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 205). Section 205 of the Restatement provides:
If the trustee commits a breach of trust, he is chargeable with (a) any loss or depreciation
in value of the trust estate resulting from the breach of trust; or (b) any profit made by
him through the breach of trust; or (c) any profit which would have accrued to the trust
estate if there had been no breach of trust.
84. LaRue, 128 S. Ct. at 1028-29.
85. U.S. CONST. amend. VII.
86. Granfinanciera, S.A. v. Nordberg, 492 U.S. 33, 41 (1989) (quoting Parsons v. Bedford,
Breedlove & Robeson, 28 U.S. (3 Pet.) 433 (1830) (Story, J.)).
87. Interestingly, even if not controlling in the area of ERISA remedial provisions, the Court decided
that the claim at issue sought the legal remedy of money damages. Curtis v. Loether, 415 U.S. 189, 197
(1974). However, the Court expressly declined to hold that all claims for monetary relief are necessarily
legal relief. Id. at 196. Nonetheless, the Court was willing to say that the right to a jury trial cannot be
denied by classifying legal relief sought as "incidental" to the equitable relief sought. Id. at 196 n.l 1.
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Thus, to determine whether the right to a jury trial attaches to
particular claims, the Court first compares the claim to 18th century
actions brought before the merger of law and equity courts. It then
determines whether the nature of the remedy sought is legal or
equitable.89 The second inquiry is more important. 90 If, on balance,
legal rights are at issue, the parties are entitled to a jury trial so long
as there is no functional justification for denying the right.91
II. ANALYSIS
A. If Claim Is Legal Rather Than Equitable Under ERISA, Parties
Have a Right to Jury Trial
In Great-West, the Court announced that to determine whether a
particular claim under ERISA was legal or equitable, it would
examine the basis of the claim and the nature of the underlying
remedies sought. 92 The Court proceeded to analogize the claim at
issue to 18th century causes of action93 and analyzed the nature of
remedy sought by reference to treatises on remedies. 94 Sereboff did
not change the test set forth in Great-West.95 Similarly, the
88. Id. at 195; see also Granfinanciera, 492 U.S. at 42 ("[T]he Seventh Amendment also applies to
actions brought to enforce statutory rights that are analogous to common-law causes of action ordinarily
decided in English law courts in the late 18th century, as opposed to those customarily heard by courts
of equity or admiralty.").
89. Granfinanciera, 492 U.S. at 42.
90. Id.
91. Id. at 42-44; Curtis, 415 U.S. at 195; Parsons v. Bedford, Breedlove & Robeson, 28 U.S. (3 Pet.)
at 434; see also ABA SECTION OF LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT LAW, supra note 11, at 635-36; ERISA
FIDUCIARY LAW, supra note 13, at 403.
92. Great-West Life & Annuity Ins. Co. v. Knudson, 534 U.S. 204, 213 (2002).
93. Id. (analogizing the instant claim to the common law writ of assumpsit).
94. Id. (observing the nature of the remedy is legal where the plaintiff sought to obtain a judgment
imposing personal liability on defendant for a sum of money).
95. See Evan Schwartz & Michail Z. Hack, ERISA Litigation: Supreme Court Ruling Undermines
Jury Trial Ban, QuADRINO SCHWARTZ, NEWS AND UPDATES, June 15, 2006,
http://www.disabilityinsurancelawyers.com/news/read/erisa-litigation-supreme-court-ruting-
undermines-jury-trial-ban (writing after Sereboff and examining Second Circuit precedent in the wake of
Great-West). If Sereboff had any impact on form of the Great- West rule, it would have been to convert
the balancing of the two general inquiries into a rigid test requiring the satisfaction of both prongs. See
Sereboff v. Mid Atd. Med. Servs., Inc., 547 U.S. 356, 363 (2006) ("While [plaintiffl's case for
characterizing its relief as equitable does not falter because of the nature of the recovery it seeks,
[plaintiff] must still establish that the basis for its claim is equitable."). Since it is possible that one prong
weighs in favor of an equitable claim while the other prong weighs in favor of a legal remedy, see Bona
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constitutional question of whether the Seventh Amendment right to a
jury trial is preserved with respect to a given claim depends on a
comparison to 18th century causes of action and a determination of
whether the remedy sought is legal or equitable in nature. 96 Indeed, it
is entirely logical that the tests would be the same or substantially the
same since both tests are aimed at determining whether the right or
remedy at issue is legal or equitable.9
7
Though the tests are almost identical on their faces, they are
nevertheless applied differently in their respective contexts. First,
Mertens holds that in determining whether a claim is equitable in the
context of ERISA, courts should look to only "those categories of
relief that were typically available in equity" rather than whatever
relief a plaintiff could receive in equity for a breach of fiduciary
duty.98 It is not clear that the Court has endorsed this approach when
applying the Seventh Amendment test.99 Since breach of fiduciary
duty claims were brought in courts of equity, the first prong of the
Seventh Amendment test will tilt toward an equitable remedy unless
the Mertens rule applies to the Seventh Amendment test as well as
the ERISA remedy test. 00 Some federal district courts applying the
Seventh Amendment test have held that although the claim sought
legal relief, the first prong weighed against permitting a jury trial
since the relief for breach of fiduciary duty was historically available
only at equity.1
0 1
v. Barasch, No. 01 Civ. 2289 (MBM), 2003 WL 1395932, at *12 ( S.D.N.Y. Mar. 20, 2003), and it is
academic that relief must be either equitable or legal, BLACK'S LAW DICTtONARY 1320 (8th ed. 2004)
(defining "remedy" as "the means of enforcing a right or preventing or redressing a wrong; legal or
equitable relief'), Sereboff must not have transformed the inquiry into a rigid test, which could result in
rendering the remedy neither legal nor equitable. See Medill, supra note 77 (suggesting Sereboff only
produced a small change in the way the Court would apply the Great-West rule).
96. Granfinanciera, 492 U.S. at 42; Curtis, 415 U.S. at 195. The Court emphasizes that the nature of
the remedy sought is the more important inquiry. Granfinanciera, 492 U.S. at 42.
97. Great-West, 534 U.S. at 212-13; Granfinanciera, 492 U.S. at 41; Curtis, 415 U.S. at 193.
98. Mertens v. Hewitt Assocs., 508 U.S. 248,256 (1993).
99. Granfinanciera, 492 U.S. at 43 (examining 18th century common law actions in bankruptcy
context to determine whether statutory bankruptcy claim was of the type that could have been brought at
law prior to the merger).
100. See Mertens, 508 U.S. at 258 (recognizing that all relief was available in equity for a breach of
fiduciary duty).
101. Chao v. Meixner, No. 1:07-CV-0595-WSD, 2007 WL 4225069, at *3 (N.D. Ga. Nov. 27, 2007);
Bona v. Barasch, No. 01 Civ. 2289(MBM), 2003 WL 1395932, at *35 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 20,2003).
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Second, the Court has been explicit in holding the second prong of
the Seventh Amendment is more important than the first,1°2 but has
not been explicit in elevating the second inquiry over the first in the
context of the ERISA remedy test.10 3 A possible explanation is that
the application of the Mertens rule to the ERISA remedy test renders
the two inquiries under the ERISA remedy test virtually
indistinguishable.
Even if the tests are slightly different, it remains almost
inconceivable that a court could determine that the relief sought is
legal under ERISA but equitable under the Seventh Amendment.
10 4
Assuming the validity of that assertion, the central question is
whether a claim for legal relief is cognizable under §§ 409 and
502(a)(2).
B. ERISA §§ 409 and 502(a)(2) Provide Legal Remedies for Breach
of Fiduciary Duty
Section 502(a)(2) permits suits against fiduciaries for breaches of
their duties to recover "appropriate" relief in light of liability created
for breach of fiduciary duty under § 409.105 While § 409 creates
liability for breaches causing loss to the plan, 10 6 the Court has
definitively held that losses to individual accounts in defined
contribution plans are remediable under § 502(a)(2).'1 7 Thus, any
beneficiary 10 8 who alleges a breach of fiduciary duty caused a loss in
102. Chauffers, Teamsters, and Helpers, Local No. 391 v. Terry, 494 U.S. 558, 565 (1990);
Granfinanciera, 492 U.S. at 42.
103. Great-West Life & Annuity Ins. Co. v. Knudson, 534 U.S. 204, 213-16 (2002). Perhaps the
Court implicitly achieved this end in Sereboff when it made the second inquiry first and side-stepped the
more difficult issues presented by the first inquiry as applied in Great-West. See Medill, supra note 77.
104. See Kusner, supra note 5, at 304 (hypothesizing that Mertens' recognition of legal remedies
under § 502(a)(2) may open the door to jury trials and encourage settlement by fiduciaries).
105. 29 U.S.C. §§ 1109, 1132(a)(2) (2000); see Mertens, 508 U.S. at 252-53 (interpreting the
interplay between ERISA §§ 409 and 502(a)(2)).
106. Mass. Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Russell, 472 U.S. 134, 144 (1985); see LaRue v. DeWolff, Boberg &
Assocs., 128 S. Ct. 1020, 1026 (2008).
107. LaRue, 128 S. Ct. at 1026.
108. Section 502(a)(2) expressly permits suits for appropriate relief under § 409 "by the Secretary [of
Labor], or by a participant, beneficiary, or fiduciary." 29 U.S.C. § I 132(a)(2). In the context of losses to
401(k) or other individual accounts under a defined contribution plan, the beneficiary is the most likely
plaintiff. See Meredith Z. Maresca, Litigation: ERISA Practitioner Says LaRue Will Give Rise to
Misrepresentation Claims in Lower Courts, PENSION & BENEFrrS DAiLY LEGAL NEWS, Oct. 3, 2008.
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value of his 401(k) plan can state a claim under § 502(a)(2) for the
type of relief provided in § 409.109 The Supreme Court has not
decided a case that turned on whether legal remedies are available
under §§ 409 and 502(a)(2), but the Court has made relevant
observations about the types of remedies available under those
sections. Most importantly, the Court has said that punitive and
extracontractual damages are not available to a beneficiary," l0
fiduciaries are personally liable for damages-"the classic form of
legal relief,""'  Congress's distinction between equitable and
remedial relief must be accorded meaning,1 12 and claims for lost
profits are cognizable." 3
1. Punitive and Extracontractual Damages Are Not Available
The Court held that beneficiaries or participants could not recover
punitive or extracontractual damages under § 502(a)(2), but explicitly
left unanswered the question of whether a fiduciary or the Secretary
of Labor could recover such damages on behalf of the plan.1 4 LaRue
suggests the proper question under § 409 is whether the breach has
caused the beneficiary to receive a lesser benefit than he would have
received absent the breach. 15 LaRue, however, does not overrule
Russell; thus, punitive and extracontractual damages remain
unavailable to participants and beneficiaries."16  In order for
fiduciaries to ever be liable for punitive and extracontractual
109. See LaRue, 128 S. Ct. at 1024 n.4 (declaring that claims for lost profits are cognizable under
§ 502(a)(2)); see also Mertens, 508 U.S. at 252 (defining the types of personal liability of fiduciaries
outlined in § 409).
110. Russell, 473 U.S. at 144.
111. Mertens, 508 U.S. at 253, 256.
112. Great-West Life & Annuity Ins. Co. v. Knudson, 534 U.S. 204,210 (2002); Mertens, 508 U.S. at
259 n.8.
113. LaRue, 128 S. Ct. at 1024 n.4.
114. Russell, 473 U.S. at 144 n.12; see also LaRue, 128 S. Ct. at 1024 (explaining the holding in
Russell as being based on the conclusion that the misconduct alleged did not "relate to the proper
management, administration, and investment of fund assets, with an eye toward ensuring that the
benefits authorized by the plan are ultimately paid to participants and beneficiaries").
115. LaRue, 128 S. Ct. at 1025-26 (explaining that fiduciary breach need not compromise the entire
plan value in order to decrease the value of benefits available to a beneficiary in a defined contribution
plan, and holding that § 502(a)(2) "authorize[s] recovery for fiduciary breaches that impair the value of
plan assets in a participant's individual account").
116. Id. at 1024.
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damages, presumably the situation would have to be such that
without their recovery beneficiaries would not receive "the benefits
authorized by the plan.""' 7
2. Congress's Distinction Between Equitable and Remedial Relief
Is Meaningful
Justice White, dissenting in Mertens, vigorously argues it is
impossible to take anything away from the apparent distinction
between "equitable" and "remedial" relief in § 409.118 Since
"remedial" means "intended as a remedy" and "relief' is a synonym
for "remedy," remedial relief is a hopeless redundancy. 119 Justice
Scalia responded to Justice White's lamentation, but while agreeing
that the distinction is "artless" Justice Scalia nevertheless concluded
that the distinction, plainly made in the text of § 409, must not be
ignored.120 Specifically, Justice Scalia wrote that equitable relief must
mean something less than all relief.12 1 However, in regards to the
question whether § 409 creates legal remedies, the meaning of
remedial relief in that context is more interesting. Presumably, in the
phrase "such other equitable or remedial relief,"'122 "remedial" means
relief that is legal rather than equitable. 1
23
Assuming ERISA distinguishes between equitable and remedial,
124
giving effect to that distinction requires recognition that § 409 creates
remedies beyond equitable ones. The term "remedial relief' appears
to have originated in the idea that courts of equity were empowered
to fashion whatever remedy necessary to afford litigants in equity
117. Id.; see also Russell, 473 U.S. at 142.
118. Mertens v. Hewitt Assocs., 508 U.S. 248, 269 n.4 (1993) (White, J., dissenting).
119. Id.
120. Id. at 259 n.8 (majority opinion).
121. Id.
122. 29 U.S.C. § 1109(a) (2000).
123. See Chao v. Meixner, No. 1:07-CV-0595-WSD, 2007 WL 4225069, at *2 (N.D. Ga. Nov. 27,
2007) (finding that causes of action under § 502(aX2) may arise at law based in part on Mertens's
language giving effect to ERISA's distinctions between equitable and remedial relief).
124. The full Mertens Court apparently agreed that the text of § 409 creates a distinction between
equitable and remedial. See Mertens, 508 U.S. at 270 n.4 (White, J., dissenting). The dissent argues that
because Congress did not carefully differentiate and failed to communicate any "limiting principle," the
distinction is meaningless. Id.
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appropriate relief for harms suffered. 125 However, under Mertens,
such remedies that may be granted by a court of equity in a particular
case are nonetheless legal remedies to the extent they are not
typically available in equity.'
26
3. The Classic Form of Legal Relief Is Available
Damages are clearly available under ERISA. 127 The rationale in
Mertens and Great-West establishes that damages are legal rather
than equitable. 128 The Court decided in Mertens that equitable relief
means relief typically available in a court of equity without reference
to the "particular case at issue."'1 29 Thus, the fact that before the
merger of law and equity courts, remedies for breach of fiduciary
duty were available exclusively at equity does not render those
remedies equitable.' 30  Rather, "whether [a remedy] is legal or
equitable depends on 'the basis for the plaintiff's claim' and the
nature of the underlying remedies sought."'131 Yet it is not apparent
what weight is accorded to "the basis for the plaintiffs claim,"'132 nor
how that inquiry differs from the rejected inquiry into whether the
remedy was available at equity in the "particular case at issue.
' 33
125. See Gompers v. Buck's Stove & Range Co., 221 U.S. 418, 444, 449 (1911) (indicating that
"remedial relief' means relief delivered by a court of equity).
126. Mertens, 508 U.S. at 257.
127. Id. at 252 (relying on language in § 409 making a breaching fiduciary "personally liable to make
good to [the] plan any losses to the plan resulting from each such breach"); see also LaRue v. DeWolff,
Boberg & Assocs., 128 S. Ct. 1020, 1024 n.4 (2008) (asserting that § 502(a)(2) provides relief for losses
suffered because assets that should have been sold declined in value or assets that should have been, but
were not, purchased increased in value).
128. Great-West Life & Annuity Ins. Co. v. Knudson, 534 U.S. 204, 210 (2002); Mertens, 508 U.S. at
256-59.
129. Mertens, 508 U.S. at 257-58 ("Since all relief available for breach of trust could be obtained
from a court of equity, limiting the sort of relief obtainable under § 502(a)(3) to 'equitable relief' in the
sense of 'whatever relief a common-law court of equity could provide in such a case' would limit the
relief not at all.").
130. Great-West, 534 U.S. at 221.
131. Id. at 213 (citing Reich v. Cont'l Cas. Co., 33 F.3d 754, 756 (7th Cir. 1994) (Posner, J.)).
132. Great-West, 534 U.S. at 205, 224 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (asserting that the majority decides
the remedy sought is equitable by reference merely to the technical requirements of the claim honored
prior to the merger).
133. Mertens, 508 U.S. at 256.
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Nevertheless, damages are available, and they are not equitable
within the meaning of ERISA.'3 4
4. Claims for Lost Profits Are Cognizable
A fiduciary is liable for losses resulting from a breach of duty not
only where the breach causes a decrease in assets, but also where the
breach prevents the plan from realizing an increase in assets. 135 Such
lost profits are consequential damages, a clear form of legal rather
than equitable relief.136 However, LaRue relies on the Restatement
(Second) of Trusts for the proposition that lost profits are
recoverable. 137 The Restatement declares that such remedy, though
available, is equitable rather than legal. 138 Perhaps this conflict
between "standard current works" epitomizes Justice Ginsburg's
concerns with Great- West's reliance on secondary sources to
determine whether a particular remedy is legal or equitable in
nature. 139 Examination of the "standard current works" thus requires
greater attention.
134. Great-West, 534 U.S. at 214. The entire Court in Great West believed that compensatory
damages are not equitable relief, including the dissent. See id. at 234 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting)
(declaring that she would hold compensatory damages were not within the ambit of "equitable relief'
under ERISA).
135. LaRue v. DeWolff, Boberg & Assocs., Inc., 128 S. Ct. 1020, 1024 n.4 (2008).
136. DAN B. DOBBS, LAW OF REMEDIES: DAMAGEs-EQuITY-RESTITUTION § 3.3(3) (2d ed., 1992).
137. LaRue, 128 S. Ct. at 1024 n.4.
138. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS §§ 197-98 (asserting that the remedies of the beneficiary
against the trustee are exclusively equitable except where the trustee fails to convey money or a chattel
to the trustee despite an immediate and unconditional duty to do so). The exception to the exclusively
equitable nature of remedies under the common law of trusts applies only to instances in which equitable
remedies have become matured legal obligations. Langbein, supra note 2, at 1317 n. 11. But see DOBBS,
supra note 136, at 163 (stating plaintiff seeking to recover a fixed sum of money has remedy at law
(citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS §§ 197-98)).
139. Great-West, 534 U.S. at 232 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (questioning the majority's "confidence in
the ability of the standard current works to make the answer clear," and observing the Court provides no
direction for resolution of conflicts between such works). Justice Ginsburg is reacting to the majority's
assertion that "[riarely will there be need for any more antiquarian inquiry' . . . than consulting . . .
standard current works such as Dobbs, Palmer, Corbin, and the Restatements, which make the answer
clear. " Id. at 217 (majority opinion).
20l1
HeinOnline -- 26 Ga. St. U. L. Rev. 989 2009-2010
10) I     989 
, l  
  134 
. i s fits izable 
      
    
   135  
i l  
 f. 136 t 
    
l .  t  
l   138 t 
 ard t  i s 's 
 t-  r   
 l r    
 ti      
 
. t,  . .  .    i  at t li  t t t ry 
  , . ,  
i  t    le ' 
  
la  ,   ., .   .  . 
.  . ,   I : S- UITY-RESTITUTION  . ( ) (  ., ). 
    
.  )     ti  t t t  i   t  fi i r  
 l  l  t     
 i l  i ely 
l    i     
     .    .ll  , 
 t  , t  (st ti  l i tiff s i  t  r r  fIXe  s  f e  as re e  at la  
 )   
. t- est,  . . t  ( i r , ., i ti ) ( ti i  t  j rit '  fi ce i  
   t  t  t  t   t   l ,   i  t  t i s  
i ti  f r r l ti   fli t  t   r ). ti  i s r  is r ti  t  t  j rity's 
ti  t t [r] r l  ill t r    f r  r  ti ri  i ir ' .. t  lti  . 
sta ar  current orks such as obbs, al er, orbin, and the estate ents, hich ake the ans er 
! .  it  . 
19
Alderman: ERISA's Remedial Irony:  Narrow Interpretation Paves the Way for
Published by Reading Room, 2010
GEORGIA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
C. Standard Current Works Are Not Definitive of Nature of
Remedies
Great-West teaches that determining the nature of the remedy
sought usually involves nothing more than consultation of the
"standard current works.' 40 The standard current works give a rather
emphatic answer to the question whether remedies for breach of
fiduciary duty are legal or equitable-they are historically,
substantively, and exclusively equitable. 141 Yet, the Court explicitly
rejected that question, 142 instead inquiring into the nature of the
remedy without reference to the particular case at issue. 143 Thus, Dan
Dobbs' admonition that although fiduciary cases are "historically and
substantively" equitable they may be legal with respect to the nature
of the remedy' 44 is of great significance under the Court's
approach. 1
45
The fact that damages are "the classic form of legal relief ' 146 is
confirmed by treatises, 147 but perhaps provides a false resolution.
Money awards other than restitution148 may be ordered pursuant to
equitable powers. 14 9 Equitable money awards are distinguished
through means of enforcement. 15° Damages are enforceable by
seizure of property, whereas equitable awards are enforceable by the
courts' contempt powers.15' Thus, the imposition of personal liability
on the fiduciary without reference to the source of liability is not
indicative of whether the remedy is legal or equitable. In practical
140. Id.
141. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 197; DOBBS, supra note 136, at 163.
142. Mertens v. Hewitt Assocs., 508 U.S. 248, 256-58 (1993).
143. Great-West, 534 U.S. at 213; Mertens, 508 U.S. at 256-58.
144. DOBBS, supra note 136, at 163.
145. The majority opinion cites Dobbs seven times. See Great-West, 534 U.S. 204.
146. E.g., Mertens, 508 U.S. at 255.
147. E.g., DOBBS, supra note 136, at 3.
148. Restitution can be equitable or legal. Great-West, 534 U.S. at 213. The contours of restitution are
important to discerning the Court's approach defining a remedy as equitable or legal, but it is of little
consequence that restitution may be equitable. The important question is whether legal restitution is
contemplated by § 409, not whether equitable restitution is contemplated as well. Section 409
unequivocally contemplates equitable remedies for which parties would not be entitled to a jury trial.
149. DOBBS, supra note 136, at 278.
150. Id. at 278-79.
151. Id.
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terms, the purpose of damages is to put the party injured by breach in
the position he would have occupied under full performance without
a breach of duty, whereas the purpose of restitution is to restore the
injured party to the position he occupied before the breach. 152 Corbin,
like Dobbs, recognizes that restitution may be legal or equitable.
153
Corbin does not expressly differentiate between pre-merger causes of
action for restitution. 
154
Personal liability is imposed "to make good to such plan any losses
to the plan resulting from each [fiduciary] breach" (damages liability
clause) and "to restore to such plan any profits of such fiduciary
which have been made through use of assets of the plan by the
fiduciary" (restitutionary liability clause). 155 ERISA's damages
liability clause may encompass equitable money awards, but it clearly
contemplates compensatory monetary relief traditionally available in
a court of law.' 56 The damages liability clause is broad enough to
include monetary relief to compensate for such losses, putting the
participant or beneficiary in the position he would have occupied if
the fiduciary had rendered performance without a breach of duty.
1 57
Indeed, damages for lost profits are available. 158 Claims for lost
profits are clearly within the paradigm of damages, and therefore
seek legal rather than equitable relief. 1
59
D. The Question of Whether Legal Relief Is Available Divides Lower
Courts
Among courts that have considered whether a claim under
§ 502(a)(2) seeks a legal remedy entitling the parties to a jury trial,
the weight of authority holds that no right to trial by jury applies to
152. ARTHUR L. CORBIN, CORBIN ON CONTRACTS § 1102 (1993).
153. Id.
154. Id.
155. 29 U.S.C. § 1109(a) (2000); see also Mertens v. Hewitt Assocs., 508 U.S. 248, 252 (1993).
156. See DOBBS, supra note 136, at 3, 163.
157. See CORBIN, supra note 152, § 1102.
158. LaRue v. DeWolff, Boberg & Assocs., Inc., 128 S. Ct. 1020, 1024 n.4 (2008).
159. See DOBBS, supra note 136, § 3.3(3). The broad admonition that remedies for breach of fiduciary
duty are equitable remedies, RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 197, is not to the contrary since
Mertens rejects an answer based on the type of relief that a court could provide in a particular case.
Mertens, 508 U.S. at 257-58.
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actions for breach of fiduciary duty. 160 Nonetheless, some courts have
determined that the right to trial by jury is preserved at least with
respect to some claims cognizable under § 502(a)(2). 16' Courts
striking jury trial demands have generally pointed to the inherently
equitable nature of actions for breach of fiduciary duty,162 while those
recognizing the jury trial right have focused on the compensatory
damages remedy sought by plaintiffs. 1
63
1. Breach of Fiduciary Duty Is Inherently Equitable in Nature
Most courts that have considered whether parties are entitled to a
jury trial for breach of fiduciary duty under § 409 have concluded
that no right to trial by jury exists since the claim is historically and
inherently equitable in nature.' 64 ERISA was drafted against the
backdrop of the common law of trusts, 165 so courts may look to the
common law of trusts to fill gaps in the statute. 166 Thus, it is logical
to look to the common law of trusts given ERISA's silence on
availability of jury trials. 167 The results of this inquiry weigh against
permitting a jury trial because remedies for breach of fiduciary duty
were both completely and exclusively available in courts of equity.'
68
Yet, Mertens rejected this inquiry when it concluded that equitable
remedies were those typically available in equity rather than those
that courts of equity were empowered to provide in a particular type
160. E.g., Abbott v. Lockheed Martin Corp., No. 06-CV-0701-MJR, 2007 WL 2316481, at *3 (S.D.
Ill. Aug. 13, 2007).
161. E.g., Chao v. Meixner, No. 1:07-CV-0595-WSD, 2007 WL 4225069, at *5 (N.D. Ga. Nov. 27,
2007).
162. E.g., Abbott, 2007 WL 2316481, at *2 (holding that ERISA claims have no antecedent in
common law and analogous actions at common law were equitable).
163. E.g., Meixner, 2007 WL 4225069, at *3 (reasoning that monetary relief for losses to compensate
the plan is an action for damages, which is legal relief).
164. Abbott, 2007 WL 2316481, at *2; Spano v. Boeing Co., No. 06-CV-743-DRH, 2007 WL
1149192, at *8 (S.D. Ill. Apr. 18, 2007); Broadnax Mills, Inc. v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Va., 876
F. Supp. 809, 816 (E.D. Va. 1995).
165. Spano, 2007 WL 1149192, at *5.
166. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Bruch, 489 U.S. 101, 109-10 (1989).
167. See Meixner, 2007 WL 4225069, at *3; Abbott, 2007 WL 2316481, at *2; Spano, 2007 WL
1149192, at *4-5, 7-8; Bona v. Barasch, No. 01 Civ. 2289 (MBM), 2003 WL 1395932, at *35
(S.D.N.Y. Mar. 20, 2003); Broadnax Mills, 876 F. Supp. at 816-17.
168. Meixner, 2007 WL 4225069, at *3; Abbott, 2007 WL 2316481, at *2; Spano, 2007 WL 1149192,
at *4-5, 7-8; Bona, 2003 WL 1395932, at *35; Broadnax Mills, 876 F. Supp. at 816-17.
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of case. 169 Moreover, even the courts that rely on this inquiry to strike
demands for jury trials concede that although ERISA may be
grounded in the common law of trusts, the statute is not coextensive
with the common law. Importantly, fiduciary duties under ERISA are
"broader and more stringent than the common law of trusts."'
170
2. Classic Legal Remedies Are Expressly Available Under
§ 502 (a) (2)
Some courts, against the weight of authority and consistent with
the Seventh Amendment test, have minimized the impact of the
comparison of the statutory claim to its 18th century analogue and
placed greater emphasis on the nature of the remedy sought. 17 1 The
Supreme Court has perhaps supplied more ammunition than the
lower courts have used in addressing this question. For example, the
Court has said that claims for lost profits 172 and compensatory
damages 173 are cognizable under § 502(a)(2), yet permitting a jury
trial remains the minority position.
The express language of ERISA permits legal and equitable
remedies for breach of fiduciary duties. 174 Although some courts have
made reference to the textual distinction between equitable and
remedial relief,175 courts have not relied on that distinction to
recognize a legal remedy not encompassed by the damages or
restitutionary liability created by § 409. Where plaintiffs seek
compensatory damages under ERISA they seek a remedy typically
and traditionally available at law.' 76 On the other hand, where
plaintiffs seek to impose restitutionary liability under § 409, the
courts must employ the rationale of Great- West to determine whether
169. Mertens v. Hewitt Assocs., 508 U.S. 248, 256-58 (1993).
170. Spano, 2007 WL 1149192, at *4. Nonetheless, even courts that permitted a jury trial concluded
that this part of the inquiry militated against its ultimate conclusion. Meixner, 2007 WL 4225069, at *3;
Bona, 2003 WL 1395932, at *35.
171. See generally Meixner, 2007 WL 4225069; Bona, 2003 WL 1395932.
172. LaRue v. DeWolff, Boberg & Assocs., Inc., 128 S. Ct. 1020, 1024 n.4 (2008).
173. Mertens, 508 U.S. at 252.
174. Meixner, 2007 WL 4225069, at *3; Bona, 2003 WL 1395932, at *34.
175. Meixner, 2007 WL4225069, at *2.
176. Id. at *2, 3; Lamberty v. Premier Millwork & Lumber Co., 329 F. Supp. 2d 737, 745 (E.D. Va.
2004); Bona, 2003 WL 1395932, at *34.
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the restitution sought is legal or equitable. 177 This inquiry essentially
requires a determination of whether plaintiffs seek return or
accounting of specific funds-indicating equitable relief-or, merely
compensation for losses-legal relief.178
III. PROPOSALS
If a claim is cognizable under § 502(a)(2) and seeks legal rather
than equitable relief, as those terms have been given meaning under
Mertens and Great-West, parties should be afforded a trial by jury
pursuant to the Seventh Amendment.
Courts must determine whether they will continue to adhere to the
logic that claims for breach of fiduciary are inherently equitable and
therefore not susceptible to the Seventh Amendment right to jury
trial, 179 or whether they will faithfully apply doctrine and precedent
to answer the difficult question of whether parties are entitled to a
jury trial. 180 Moreover, courts have signaled that they are "reluctant to
tamper with ERISA's carefully crafted and detailed enforcement
scheme."' 181 Yet the Supreme Court has decried the lack of
sophistication in certain remedial provisions,' 82 and Justices have
often attacked lofty characterizations of the remedial provisions.'
83
The refusal of some courts to fully engage the complicated analysis is
not careful application of precedent but an unfaithful side-step of a
complex issue. Concededly, the issue is made complex by the
decision in Mertens to define equitable relief as that typically
available in equity rather than that relief available at equity in a
particular case. 184 Mertens could have easily chosen the broader
interpretation, rendering all relief under § 502(a)(2) inherently
177. Meixner, 2007 WL 4225069, at *4.
178. Id.
179. E.g., In re Vorphal, 695 F.2d 318, 322 (8th Cir. 1982).
180. See Meixner, 2007 WL 4225069, at *5.
181. E.g., White v. Martin, No. 99-1447 (JRT/FLN), 2002 WL 598432, at *2 (D. Minn. Apr. 12,
2002).
182. Mertens v. Hewitt Assocs., 508 U.S. 248, 259 n.8 (1993).
183. Id. at 269 n.4 (White, J., dissenting); Mass. Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Russell, 473 U.S. 134, 156-57
(1985) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
184. See Langbein, supra note 2, at 1337-38.
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equitable and removing any notion of a jury trial right for breach of
fiduciary duty under ERISA. 18 5 Yet, Mertens and Great-West are
controlling and the lower courts cannot ignore them when
considering jury trial demands.' 86
A. If Claim Is Legal Within the Meaning of ERISA, Parties Are
Entitled to Trial by Jury
Whether a claim seeks equitable relief within the meaning of
ERISA's remedial provisions depends on whether the remedy was
typically available in a court of equity.' 87 Courts determine whether
claims are legal or equitable by inquiring into the basis of the claim
and the nature of the remedy sought.1 88 A claim must be either legal
or equitable; there simply are no other types of claims.1 89 The
Seventh Amendment jury trial right may be invoked where the claim
is legal rather than equitable.' 90 To determine whether a claim is legal
or equitable in this context, courts must compare the claim to 18th
century causes of action prior to the merger and examine the nature
of the remedy sought-the more important of the two inquiries, and
decide whether, on balance, the claim is legal or equitable.' 9 1 If
different in form, these tests cannot differ in substance to the extent
that they might yield different results, since, at bottom, both tests are
concerned with discerning legal from equitable rights.192 For these
tests to yield different results, a court would have to hold that a
185. See id. at 1355.
186. Bona v. Barasch, No. 01 Civ. 2289 (MBM), 2003 WL 1395932, at *34 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 20,
2003).
187. Mertens, 508 U.S. at 257.
188. Great-West Life & Annuity Ins. Co. v. Knudson, 534 U.S. 204, 213 (2002).
189. See Granfinanciera, S.A. v. Nordberg, 492 U.S. 33, 41 (1989) ("We have consistently interpreted
the phrase '[s]uits at common law' to refer to suits in which legal rights were to be ascertained and
determined, in contradistinction to those where equitable rights alone were recognized, and equitable
remedies were administered." (internal quotations omitted)).
190. Id.
191. Id. at 42.
192. Great-West, 534 U.S. at 213; Granfinanciera, 492 U.S. at 41. But see Great-West, 534 U.S. at
233 (2002) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (arguing that looking to pre-merger causes of action makes sense
in the Seventh Amendment test but not in the ERISA test since the statute was enacted in 1974-long
after the days of the divided bench). However, Congress clearly did refer specifically to "equitable
relief' in ERISA, and that modifier must be given meaning. See id. at 217-18 (majority opinion);
Mertens, 508 U.S. at 258.
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particular claim is legal within the meaning of ERISA, but equitable
within the meaning of the Seventh Amendment. Without reference to
the tests prescribed by the Court, there simply is no basis for defining
legal and equitable differently based on context. 193 The distinction
between legal and equitable must be the same in both contexts.,
94
Thus, in the same manner that courts have excluded claims not within
ERISA's meaning of equitable, 195 they must determine those types of
claims are legal and subject to the Seventh Amendment right to jury
trial so long as they are cognizable under § 502(a)(2). 96
Starting from the noncontroversial premise that all relief is either
legal or equitable, and accepting that all relief which is not equitable
is legal and that equitable relief is that relief which was typically
available in courts of equity, the conclusion is warranted that relief
not typically available in courts of equity is legal relief. Since claims
for damages, or monetary relief, were not typically available in
equity, 197 they are claims for legal relief. Finally, damages are
available for breach of fiduciary duty under § 502(a)(2),' 98 and legal
relief is therefore available under § 502(a)(2).
B. Section 502(a)(2) Cognizes Claims for Legal Relieffor Breach of
Fiduciary Duty
Pursuant to §§ 409 and 502(a)(2), a "fiduciary is personally liable
for damages" resulting from a breach of fiduciary duty.199 Perhaps
nothing is more apparent from the line of cases interpreting ERISA's
remedial provisions than the declaration that a suit for damages is a
suit for legal relief.200 The test on which the Court has relied to
conclude the damages remedy is available is found in § 409: "[A
193. See Bona v. Barasch, No. 01 Civ. 2289 (MBM), 2003 WL 1395932, at *34 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 20,
2003) ("Although [Great-West] did not deal with the right to a jury trial per se, the Supreme Court's
explication of the distinction between law and equity... is relevant here as well.").
194. See Schwartz & Hack, supra note 95.
195. E.g., Great-West, 534 U.S. at 210.
196. The claim in Great-West, although legal, was not cognizable under § 502(a)(2) because the
plaintiffs did not allege a breach of fiduciary duty. Id. at 207-09.
197. Id. at 210.
198. Mertens v. Hewitt Assocs., 508 U.S. 248, 252 (1993).
199. Id.
200. Great-West, 534 U.S. at 213; Mertens, 508 U.S. at 255 (1993).
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fiduciary in breach of duty] shall be personally liable to make good to
such plan any losses to the plan resulting from each such breach."201
Before LaRue, few claims could be stated by a participant or
beneficiary for damages under this section since it was concerned
with losses to the plan rather than to individuals.20 2 However, LaRue
held that, because defined contribution plans have become the
predominant form of pension plan, individuals could bring suit
against fiduciaries for losses to individual accounts.20 3 Thus, at least
in a defined contribution plan-those plans that use 401(k) accounts
as the means of administering pension plans-participants and
beneficiaries can easily state a claim for damages under § 502(a)(2),
and fiduciaries of defined contribution plans are aware of greater
potential for litigation concerning their actions. 204 LaRue suggests
that the damages clause of § 409 has teeth that it did not have-or at
least was not perceived to have-under Russell.
Justice Thomas, concurring in judgment, warns that "a participant
suing to recover benefits on behalf of the plan is not entitled to
monetary relief payable directly to him; rather, any recovery must be
paid to the plan."2°5 Justice Thomas, joined by Justice Scalia,
anticipated the jury trial argument and sought to avoid it by treating
the damages clause as creating only an equitable remedy to
participants or beneficiaries. Yet, Justices Thomas and Scalia
unequivocally did not agree with the rationale of the Court-instead
they reasoned that damages to an individual account were damages to
plan assets.20 6 The Court's opinion, focusing on the damage to an
individual account rather than the "entire plan," is not susceptible to
the same argument converting the participant's legal rights into
201. 29 U.S.C. § 1109(a) (2000).
202. See Mass. Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Russell, 473 U.S. 134, 140 (1985) (explaining that although a
participant or beneficiary is authorized to bring suit, potential personal liability of the fiduciary runs to
the plan rather than the participant).
203. LaRue v. DeWolff, Boberg & Assocs., 128 S. Ct. 1020, 1026 (2008).
204. Posting of Stephen D. Rosenberg to Boston ERISA and Insurance Litigation Blog, Will LaRue
Actually Lead to an Increase in Litigation?, http://www.bostonerisalaw.com/archives/401k-plans-will-
larue-actually-lead-to-an-increase-in-litigation.html (Feb. 29, 2008).
205. LaRue, 128 S. Ct. at 1029 (Thomas, J., concurring injudgment).
206. Id.
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equitable ones. Ordinarily, successful suits by participants or
beneficiaries under § 502(a)(2) for damages resulting from a breach
of fiduciary duty will result in monetary recovery to the plaintiffs
individual account.20 8 "Almost invariably ... suits seeking (whether
by judgment, injunction, or declaration) to compel the defendant to
pay a sum of money to the plaintiff are suits for 'money
damages."' 20 9 As noted above, "' [d]amages' refers to money awarded
as reparation for injury resulting from breach of legal duty" and to
"compensate plaintiff for a loss," while "specific relief prevents or
undoes the loss. ' '210 Thus, monetary relief paid to the plaintiff's
individual account for damages suffered as a result of a breach of
legal duty satisfy the rubric of legal relief urged by Justice Scalia and
later accepted by the Court in Mertens and Great-West.
The final liability clause in § 409 subjects the breaching fiduciary
to "such other equitable or remedial relief as the court may deem
appropriate.",211 This provision indicates that "equitable" means a
category of relief less than all relief.212 By implication and extension
of the same logic, "remedial relief' must include something other
than "equitable" relief.2 13 Assuming the validity of this construction,
"remedial relief' must mean legal relief because it cannot refer only
to equitable relief.
214
Therefore, the plain meaning of the text of § 409 indicates that at
least some suits brought under § 502(a)(2) involve legal rights and
obligations, which entitle the parties to a trial by jury.
207. Id. at 1025-26 (majority opinion) ("Russell's emphasis on protecting the 'entire plan' from
fiduciary misconduct reflects the former landscape of employee benefit plans. That landscape has
changed.").
208. See id. at 1029 (Thomas, J., concurring in judgment).
209. Bowen v. Massachusetts, 487 U.S. 879, 918-19 (1988) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
210. Id. at 913-14.
211. 29 U.S.C. § 1109(a) (2000). Nothing suggests that this appropriateness standard differs in any
way from the appropriateness standard supplied by § 502(a)(2). See 29 U.S.C. § I 132(a)(2) (2000).
212. Mertens v. Hewitt Assocs., 508 U.S. 248, 259 n.8 (1993).
213. See id.
214. See id. at 258 ("We will not read the statute to render the modifier superfluous.").
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C. The Supreme Court May Avoid Related Questions in Anticipation
of Change
The Court recently declined an opportunity "to address when
monetary awards for breaches of fiduciary can qualify as equitable
relief . . . under ERISA. 215 It is not clear what role, if any,
anticipation of healthcare reform and ERISA reform played in the
Supreme Court's denial of certiorari in this case. 2 16 Regardless,
speculation regarding healthcare and ERISA reform escalated upon
the election of Barack Obama, and the expansion of Democrat
control of Congress. 217 With the passage of the Patient Protection and
Affordable Care Act (PPACA)218 making no overt changes to
ERISA's remedial scheme and no impending likelihood for change,
the Court may be more willing to revisit relief available under
§ 502(a)(2). Accordingly, the healthcare reform efforts should not
impact the Court's certiorari decisions; however, it is unclear (and
beyond the scope of this Note) whether health reform efforts and
PPACA will affect federal courts' analysis in ERISA cases.
CONCLUSION
When the Supreme Court held that "equitable" means "those
categories of relief typically available in a court of equity," rather
than whatever relief a court of equity could have granted in a
particular case, it started down the path of narrowing the number of
cognizable claims under ERISA.219 However, by narrowing the scope
of "equitable" relief, the Court broadened the number of cognizable
claims that would be defined as "legal" relief. This narrowing trend
215. Posting of Stephen D. Rosenberg to Boston ERISA and Insurance Litigation Blog, From
Preemption to ERISA Standing, and Lots of Things In-Between, http://www.bostonerisalaw.com/
archives/cat-equitable-relief.html (June 30, 2008).
216. Amschwand v. Spherion Corp, 128 S. Ct. 2995 (2008) (denial of cert.).
217. Posting of Paul M. Secunda to Workplace Prof Blog, Obama and the Future of Labor and
Employment Law, http://lawprofessors.typepad.com/laborprof blog/2008/1 1/obama-and-the-f.html
(Nov. 5, 2008).
PUB. L. No. 111-148, 124 Stat. 119 (2010).
218. PuB. L. No. 111-148, 124 Stat. 119 (2010).
219. Mertens, 508 U.S. at 256.
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continued in Great- West.22 0 As a consequence of this development,
those cognizable claims defined by default as legal rather than
equitable became susceptible to the Seventh Amendment right to trial
by jury, which attaches to claims concerning legal rather than
equitable rights.22' Since both the ERISA test for whether a claim is
legal or equitable and the Seventh Amendment test for whether the
parties are entitled to a jury trial are designed to determine whether
the claim at issue is legal or equitable, it is unsurprising that they are
similar. 222 It would be anomalous to hold that a claim is legal under
one test and equitable under the other.22
3
A wide range of suits may be brought under ERISA, including
224claims for breach of fiduciary duty under § 502(a)(2). Despite the
fact that courts of equity had exclusive jurisdiction over breach of
fiduciary duty claims, 225 a claim for breach of fiduciary duty under
ERISA is not automatically equitable.226 Indeed, ERISA is grounded
in the common law of trusts and, in certain instances, informed by
that common law. But ERISA is not coextensive with the common
law of trusts.2 27 Great- West directs that when the question arises as to
whether a particular claim is equitable or legal, the courts must
inquire into the basis of the claim and nature of the remedy sought.228
The inquiry into the basis of the claim analogizes the claim at issue to
18th century causes of action, but does so without regard to the fact
that a claim for breach of fiduciary duty would have been brought in
a court of equity which could have awarded all forms of relief.229 The
Court has recognized that some claims for legal relief are cognizable
220. Great-West Life & Annuity Ins. Co. v. Knudson, 534 U.S. 204, 210, 212-13 (2002).
221. Parsons v. Bedford, 28 U.S. (3 Pet.) 433, 446-47 (1830).
222. See Kusner, supra note 5, at 304; Schwartz & Hack, supra note 95.
223. See Kusner, supra note 5, at 304.
224. 29 U.S.C. §§ 1109(a), 1132(a)(2) (2000).
225. Mertens v. Hewitt Assocs., 508 U.S. 248, 257 (1993).
226. Id. at 252.
227. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Bruch, 489 U.S. 101, 109-11 (1989).
228. Great-West Life & Annuity Ins. Co. v. Knudson, 534 U.S. 204, 213 (2002).
229. See Great-West, 534 U.S. at 213, 215; Mertens, 508 U.S. at 258.
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FIDUCIARY DUTY UNDER ERISA
under § 502(a)(2) 23 0 and implied that other legal claims may be
cognizable as well.23'
If a particular claim is legal rather than equitable within the
meaning of ERISA, it is highly unlikely that the constitutional right
to trial by jury will not apply since the Seventh Amendment test
emphasizes the inquiry into the nature of the remedy sought over the
comparison of the particular claim to causes of action existing prior
to the merger of law and equity courts. 232 Although the Seventh
Amendment test is perhaps subtly different, the difference should not
yield a different result than the ERISA test, as both seek-to determine
whether the underlying claim involves legal rights and obligations.
233
After LaRue's holding extended to participants and beneficiaries
the right to recover losses to their individual defined contribution
accounts, some members of the Court signaled a desire to temper this
right by insinuating the claim would be equitable rather than legal.234
The rationale of the Court does not support such a holding,2 35 and
even if the Court later adopts such a rule, it would not convert all
§ 502(a)(2) claims into equitable ones.
Thus, § 502(a)(2) recognizes claims involving legal rights and
obligations that entitle parties to the constitutional right to trial by
jury.
230. Mertens, 508 U.S. at 252 (declaring that fiduciaries are personally liable for damages).
231. Id. at 258 n.8 (implying that "remedial relief' entails legal relief as opposed to equitable relief).
232. Granfmanciera, S.A. v. Nordberg, 492 U.S. 33, 41-42 (1989).
233. See Kusner, supra note 5, at 304.
234. LaRue v. DeWolff, Boberg & Assocs., 128 S. Ct. 1020, 1029 (2008) (Thomas, J., concurring in
judgment) ("Of course, a participant suing to recover benefits on behalf of the plan is not entitled to
monetary relief payable directly to him; rather, any recovery must be paid to the plan.").
235. See id. at 1026.
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